UNIMAGINED STATES
A structural history of warfare in Chad
(1968-1990)[1]

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ABSTRACT

This article, using the case of Chad, and placing it in comparative context, suggests that Third World militarism has not been fully imagined. Specifically, it will argue that a process which constitutes violent institutions has escaped the notice of students of militarism. Further, it will suggest that this process, called that of dispersion of violent force, has placed a number of Third World states under siege, occasionally provoking their descent into anarchy. The existence of such processes raises the question of whether Third World states are undergoing a structural history that is fundamentally different from that which characterized the evolution of the modern great powers. This investigation is made using a structural history approach.

KEYWORDS: Warfare, Chad, Militarism, Third World, State.

RESUMEN

A través del caso del Chad y ubicándolo en un contexto comparativo, este artículo sugiere que el militarismo tercermundista no ha sido completamente imaginado. Específicamente, se argumenta que el proceso por el cual se constituyen instituciones violentas ha escapado de la atención de los estudiosos del militarismo. Adicionalmente se sugerirá que ese proceso, llamado la dispersión de la fuerza violenta, ha ubicado bajo la mira a varios estados tercermundistas derivando ocasionalmente en su anarquía. A la existencia de tales procesos subyace la cuestión de una historia que es fundamentalmente diferente a aquella que caracteriza la evolución de los grandes poderes modernos. Esta investigación se elabora a partir de una aproximación de la historia estructural.

PALABRAS CLAVES: Guerra, Chad, Militarismo, Tercer Mundo, Estado.

Introduction

In 1990 Idriss Déby, once head of the army in Hissen Habré's government, then head of his own national liberation movement, engineered a number of military victories against Habré that drove his former boss into exile in the Novotel in northern Camerouns. Déby then assumed the presidency in December of 1990. Since that time perhaps seven national liberation «armies» have formed and operate in southern, northern, eastern, and

western Chad. All seek to do unto Déby what he did to Habré. In the east central portion of the country, armed gangs called by wags in the capital N'Katha Zulu murder, pillage, and sell their loot in neighboring Sudan. The French felt obliged in 1992 to send military assistance. There were massacres of suspected rebels by government troops just north of the capital in 1993. Abbas Koty, a former Chief of Staff in Déby's regime, led a coup attempt in October 1993. There is speculation as to whether the state in Chad will disintegrate, again![2]

The military has a «central role» in Third World states (CAMMACK, POOL and TORDOFF 1993: 133). This article, using the case of Chad, and placing it in comparative context, suggests that Third World militarism has not been fully imagined[3]. Specifically, it will argue that a process which constitutes violent institutions has escaped the notice of students of militarism. Further, it will suggest that this process, called that of dispersion of violent force, has placed a number of Third World states under siege, occasionally provoking their descent into anarchy. The existence of such processes raises the question of whether Third World states are undergoing a structural history that is fundamentally different from that which characterized the evolution of the modem great powers. This investigation is made using a structural history approach. A word is in order concerning the approach.

Approach

«*The fundamental problem in Chad is above all a structural problem...*»
(*Moise Ketté, February 27, in FBIS 1994*).

Ketté, the leader of a rebel movement in southern Chad, is correct. Specifically, it is a problem that results from the existence of a type of relations of domination. In order to understand what is being said, the notion of relations of domination needs to be introduced.

Societies may be represented as networks of organizations of power. Understanding how such networks are constituted and how their constitutions change depends upon two related notions, those of force and power. Actions do not simply occur. Rather they happen because something has the power to make them happen. Power, the ability to make things occur, ultimately results from the exercise of force; which is the utilization of combinations of different resources that can generate different outcomes. Force is not power. It is that which makes power. The amount of powder in a cartridge has to do with its force. The fact that the bullet when fired penetrated six inches has to do with its power. Force is not always violent. Missionaries exercise non violent force that has the power to covert some. Crucifixion is an exercise of violent force that has the power to slow conversion[4].

Individuals who are utterly alone posses only the force of their single bodies. Social structures, on the other hand, stockpile resources which gives them, relative to individuals, enormous endowments of force. Thus it is organizations that effectively possess the force that can be exercised to generate different powers. This implies, if history is temporal ordering of actions, that it is exercises of force in networks of social structures which generates the powers that produces the actions that are history. Such a history is a structural history.

History involves an analysis of relations of domination. These are the structures in which certain actors

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[2] For reasons that will become clear later in the text I prefer not to use the Weberian definition of the state. Rather, a «state» is understood to be a territory in which there are two sets of institutions, those of a central government and those of the civil society, where the government in varying degrees attempts to dominate persons within the civil society. States «disintegrate» when the organs of the central government either cease to function or barely function. They «reintegrate» when these begin to operate again.

[3] Use of the term imagined in the text, though suggested by Anderson (1983), should not be construed as acceptance of his views. Indeed, an implicit position of this article is that much of what goes on in social life comes as an unimagined surprise.

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[4] A relations of domination approach to structural history is presented in Reyna (1994a). Discussion of precolonial relations of domination in Chad are addressed in Reyna (1994b). Changes to the relations of domination during the colonial and postcolonial periods are analyzed in Reyna (forthcoming).

control, i.e. dominate, other actors in a population. Domination requires force and this, as just suggested, is exercised by institutions with resource endowments. Such endowments, including capital, people, tools, raw materials, and the knowledge of how to combine these to attain ends might be conceived of as means of domination.

Organizations with interacting actors, as in the state, exercising different forces, constitute a force field. Actors exercising force against each other to control each other are in conflict. Weaker actors expending force to frustrate stronger ones are exhibiting resistance. More powerful actors, whose exercise of force results in their control over weaker actors, have dominated the latter and have established relations of domination in fields of force.

Anarchy, as here defined, is a situation where the operation and distribution of forces in a field of force are such that it is not possible to produce stable relations of domination. Processes in fields of force in which force is accumulated within a particular institution are those of concentration. Processes in which the reverse occurs, and force is diffused among a number of institutions, are those of dispersion. Sometimes the dispersion of violent force can raise resistance to levels where it is impossible to establish enduring relations of domination, provoking anarchy.

I argue that a dispersion of violent force has occurred in certain Third World countries since the end of World War II. The argument is developed as follows. A history of the postcolonial Chadian state is provided in the following section. Next the possibility that this history might be explained in terms of ethnicity and nationalism is discussed and rejected. Then there is a demonstration of how great and regional powers instituted a dispersion of violent force that made the state an anarchic field of force in Chad. A final section puts the instance of Chad in a comparative context, suggesting that what happened in Chad is the replacement of a Weberian state by a postmodern variant; a transformation that, though currently unimagined, is not uncommon in the Third World, and may well be of historic dimensions.

A brief word is in order about Chad. It is a large country of 1,284,000 square kilometers, roughly twice the size of France, that occupies most of what is known as the central Sudan. There has been a tendency of both officials and scholars to imagine this region as composed of two very different parts a north and a south. The latter region is to the south and west of the Shari river. It is an area of relatively well watered savanna, occupying perhaps a fifth of the country, with about one half its approximately six million population. The major ethnic groups in the south prior to colonization were stateless, non-Muslim Sara and Masa speakers.

The north is a far more arid region. The extreme north in a rough parallelogram running from the Tibesti mountains to the Ennedi Highlands to the Wadai plateau to Lake Chad is desert. Immediately south of the desert is a sahelian zone. Most of the ethnic groups in the north were Muslim. Camel pastoralists, called Tubu, controlled the desert. Cattle pastoralists, who tended to be Arab speakers, transhumed south of the Tubu. Stretching from west to east in this zone were a string of precolonial states such as Bagirmi and Wadai. Chad was colonized by the French starting around 1900. It was they who first imposed a state organization over the north and south and who dominated the two regions from their capital in what is today N'Djamena. Independence was granted in 1960.

Unimagined endings

Chad, thus, has been independent for 34 years. During this period there have been five presidents: Francois Tombalbaye (1960 - 75), Felix Malloum (1975 - 79), Goukouni Oueddeni (1980 - 82), Hissen Habré (1982 - 90) and Idriss Déby (1990 present). Particulars of each ruler's reign are described in order to establish the existence of a distinctive praxis in Chadian politics[5].

An election was held a year prior to Independence (1960) that was won by the *Parti Progressiste Tchadien* (PPT), whose head Tombalbaye had the right to become the first president of the fledgling republic. Throughout 1961 - 62 Tombalbaye disposed of all his southern, party

[5] Discussion of the Chadian civil wars roughly between 1966 and 1980 can be found in Buijtenhijs (1978), Bouquet (1982), Chapelle (1980), Reyna (ND). Accounts of post 1980 events can be found in Boyd (1984), Joffe (1986), Kelley (1986), Lanne (1987), and May (1990). For events in the 1990s I have relied upon my own interviews.

rivals. In 1963 he turned against the northerners. At the same time, he made the PPT the sole legal party and himself president for life. At this point many of those who would rebel against Tombalbaye fled the country.

A national liberation movement called the *Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad* (Frolinat) was formed in 1966. Two rebel fighting forces were created: *la Premiere Armée*, that operated in east central regions, and *la Deuzieme Armée*, that fought in the extreme north. France supplied up to 3000 troops to support Tombalbaye's *Armée Nationale Tchadienne* (ANT) between 1969 and 1971. These troops employed tactics that emphasized the use of air power for ground support, tactics that resembled those that the U.S. was using at the same time in Viet Nam. The French won every engagement and were gratified by the success of their 20 mm helicopter mounted cannon.

Qaddafi gained control of Libya in 1969 and, though initially wary of Frolinat, he had come to see it by 1970 as useful to his ends. With the support of Soviet block nations, specially East Germany, the First and Second Armies were trained and armed by the Libyans (BUIJTENHUIJS 1978). When the French ceased direct military intervention in June of 1971, the strengthened Frolinat forces crushed the ANT. As a result, Tombalbaye was assassinated (1975) by elements of his own security forces.

Tombalbaye was replaced by his former Chief of Staff, Malloum, who governed as the head of the *Conseil Supérieur Militaire* (CSM). The forces opposing Tombalbaye had not been defeated and they continued to oppose Malloum. However, a split occurred in the 2nd Army, with its former leaders dividing it into two new forces. One part became the *Forces Armées du Nord* (FAN). This was led by Habré, a former official in the Tombalbaye regime. The other part became the *Forces Armées Populaires* (FAP). This was commanded by Goukouni, the son of the head (*derdé*) of the Teda, and only major leader who was not an ex official. Malloum would be supported by the French. FAN and especially FAP would have Libyan assistance.

During the first three years of the Malloum regime French military support for the CSM gradually eroded. Libyan support, especially for the FAN, greatly increased.

FAN troops continued to receive training from the Libyans as well as sophisticated arms such as SAM missiles and incendiary phosphorous mortars.

As a result of this situation, Malloum was routed by 1978. However, by this time Habré and Goukouni were in conflict with each other over Libya, with the latter pro and the former anti Qaddafi. A defeated Malloum sought to profit from this split by inviting Habré to join his government. Habré did so, infiltrated FAN into the capital, overcame Malloum (when the French deserted him) in 1979. However, a year latter Goukouni, massively supported by the Libyans and their Soviet block allies, fought Habré in the streets of N'Djamena.

This combat was witnessed by a US military person who was a veteran of Viet Nam. He described the fighting as more intense than he had experienced at Hué during the Tet offensive. Habré, unable to stand against an estimated 200 Soviet T54 and T55 tanks, was driven for the first time into exile at the Novotel in the northern Camerouns[6].

Goukouni, then, proceeded to rule in 1980, presiding over a government known as the *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition* (GUNT). However, the FAN had not been destroyed. On the Sudan/Chad border Habré would enlarge, rearm, and retrain his forces. US support during this period seems to have been decisive. One source estimates that a $100 million in military aid was delivered to the Sudan destined for the FAN (JOFFE 1986: 95). Habré was of interest to the Americans because his anti Libyan stance was seen as a useful instrument for Reagan's anti Qaddafi policy. A CIA backed FAN marched largely unopposed during the dry season of 1982. The French remained neutral. GUNT was evicted from the capital in June of 1982. Habré was declared President.

Just as Goukouni could not destroy the FAN, Habré did not destroy the GUNT; and it immediately plotted armed opposition, finding a willing ally in Qaddafi. By early

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[6] The exact extent of Libyan/Soviet block support for Goukouni is unknown. However, it has been suggested by one source that some 14,000 Libyan troops were withdrawn from Chad on November 4, 1981 (LEMARCHAND 1984). These troops were conventionally armed with considerable Soviet block logistical support.

1984 an army was created, the *Armée de la Libération* (ANL). This was organized in two main fronts. In the north were units that ultimately descended from Frolinat. These included the FAP, firmly under the control of Goukouni, and pro Libyan. There was also a revived 1st Army, the CDR (which through late 1984 provided 60% of the GUNT's manpower), the *Volcan* Army and the FAO. There was also a non Frolinat contingent in this northern front. These were soldiers from Tombalbaye's ANT. They were led by a southern leader, Col. Abdul Kadir Kamougue, who had been a officer in Tombalbaye's military and who was then Goukouni's Vice President in the exiled GUNT. Kamougue's men supplied about 25 % of the GUNT's manpower through the end of 1984.

After assuming the presidency, Habré had sent his forces into southern Chad to establish authority. The troops led by Déby were involved in atrocities that precipitated the creation of purely southern guerilla movements. These were called *codos*, an abbreviation of commandos. There were at least six of these by the middle of 1984: the *Codos Rouge, Vert, Espoir, Noir, Vert Aigle,* and *Cocotier.* Most *codo* fighters came from the defunct ANT. Though originally autonomous, the *codos* agreed in October of 1984 to unite with the GUNT. Thus, by 1984 Habré faced a considerable coalition of ANL forces. This, however, was their high point.

The ANL was supported by Libya. In 1986, with very considerable assistance from the Soviets and East Germans, Libya invaded northern Chad, ostensibly in support of its allies. This had a double effect. On the one hand, a number of GUNT leaders went over to Habré because he, compared to Qaddafi, was viewed as the lesser of two evils. On the other hand, Libyan invasion brought both the French and the Americans strongly into Habré's camp. French, American, and Chadian personnel campaigned together throughout 1987. When it was over a tenth of Libya's army was lost and «Fred», an American of unknown connections, was busy «turning» Libyan prisoners into a contra force.

The extent of great power involvement at this time was considerable. Since 1983, when the French became firmly committed to Habré, they were estimated to have spent on the order of $500,000 per day defending him against the ANL (JAMES 1986: 81). During the period

1986 87, when Goukouni was defeated, the French were reported to have spent $100 millions in Chad (JAMES 1987: 22). These were the largest French military operations since the Algerian War (LEMARCHAND 1984: 65). US support during the 1986 87 period was also substantial. It rushed in «...$25 million worth of military aid in addition to the regular $5 million in military assistance.... At times giant American Hercules C 130 cargo planes landed on an almost daily basis in N'Djamena, ferrying in military supplies in the form of trucks, guns, ammunition, and Redeye anti aircraft missiles» (JAMES 1987: 21). It is most implausible that Habré could have defeated the GUNT coalition without the help of his great power friends.

However, even in victory opposition to Habré reemerged swiftly from elements of his own administration. He had originally come to power with considerable assistance from Idriss Miskine, who had led a rebel group from the Guera. Miskine died in 1984, officially as a result of «malaria;» though it was widely believed that he had been killed by a unit of Habré's secret service known as «the Vultures.» As a result, persons from the Guera in Habré's government became disaffected and formed in 1987 a rebel force called the *Mouvement de Salut National* (MOSNAT).

The architects of Habré's success against the Libyans had been two persons often said to be Zagawa. The first of these was Hassan Djamous, who had been the Chief of Staff in the war against Libya. The second was Idriss Déby, the army commander. Fearing that they might perish as did Miskine, Djamous, Déby, and the then Interior Minister, Itno staged a coup on April 1989. It failed and Itno and Djamous paid with their lives. Déby fought his way to the Sudan. There, after receiving «money and military equipment» from Libya, he created a rebel force, the *Mouvement Patriotique du Salut* (MPS) (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 1989: 8). The MPS united with MOSNAT. This force is reported to have received assistance from Togo and Burkina Faso (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 1990e: 4).

Habré, for his part, concentrated his forces aggressively in the heart of Zagawa territory in early 1990. He did this with military assistance from Zaire, Israel, Iraq, and the US (see AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 1990e: 4 - 5; and AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 1989: 4).

If there was not a formal US/ Israeli/Iraqi alliance to aid Habré, there was certainly an «informal» working relationship. The level of US support for Habré at this time is unclear. He is described as having «close connections with the US» and as employing «former US Marines as personal bodyguards» (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 1990b: 3). Nevertheless, on November 25 there was a spectacular defeat of Habré at Iriba. A month latter Habré was on the road again to the now familiar Novotel.

At present, the pattern is repeating itself. There are currently probably seven rebel movements that seek to destroy Déby's government. The most important of these is the *Conseil de Salut National pour la Paix et la Démocratie au Tchad* (CSNPDT) located in southern Chad. This is headed by Moise Ketté, who was a member of Habré's notorious secret security service. The CSNPDT is described as «growing» in 1993 (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 1993: 6). A spokesman for the group, said to number 7000, announced in September of last year, «We are prepared to die, they will have to exterminate us» (FBIS 1993: 1).

In the region near Lake Chad a *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (MDD) is operating. This group seems to have been created by Habré. It is described as having an «impressive range of military hardware¼» (WEST AFRICA 1992: 69). The MDD, nicknamed the Khmer Rouge, is said to be made of largely of members of Habré's old secret police and his army. It is described as wealthy and as CIA supported (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 1993: 6). As a result of the raids of groups like the CSNPDT and the MDD there is again talk of the «fragmentation» of Chad (Ibid.: 5).

Every president's rule, save for that of the current officeholder, has ended in his violent overthrow. These unintended endings, at least from the vantage of the dispossessed president, are the signature of Chadian political praxis. They involve an alternation between disintegration, towards the end of a reign, and reintegration at the beginning of a new reign. The structural history of the Chadian state is one in which governments have lacked the ability to dominate rebel movements. Five times the government has had its domination unravel as taxes went unpaid, as officials also went unpaid, as roads crumbled, as schools closed, and legal cases went unheard. If, as defined in the first section, anarchy is a situation where there are unstable relations of domination in fields of force, then Chad regularly descends into anarchy. Readers should understand that nobody in Chad intended this situation. This poses the question, why the unimagined anarchy?

Ethnicity

More often than not journalists and scholars have attributed the civil wars that make and unmake presidential regimes in Chad to tribal or ethnic conflict[7]. Such explanations are only convincing if, indeed, the belligerencies just described have been ethnic. War may be said to be «ethnic» if two conditions are satisfied. The first of these is that the immediate cause of hostilities involves disputes between existing ethnicities. The second condition is that hostilities are performed by institutions of the ethnicities in conflict.

Belligerence is sometimes initiated in Chad as a result of confrontations between ethnicities. However, the *casus belli* of the wars described earlier appears to have been the political defeat of an official. Frolinat's founders had been ousted by Tombalbaye. Habré rearmed FAN after 1980 because he been ousted by Goukouni. Déby organized the MPS because he had been ousted by Habré.

Hostilities also occurred as a result of anticipated political gains. Habré, for example, had been a relatively low official in the Tombalbaye regime. However, he switched sides and went over to Frolinat in the early 1970s because he seems to have calculated that he could rise farther as an organizer of Frolinat forces.

It should equally be noted that the civil wars did not involve the institutions of ethnicities. Neither the armies of pre colonial states like Bagirmi or Wadai, nor the kin based militia of acephalous ethnicities such as the Sara were mobilized to fight the wars of high officials. Rebel fighting units were trained in the case of Frolinat

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[7] Buijtenhijis (1978) argues from the perspective of northern Chad in favor of treating Chad's civil wars as ethnic conflicts.

by Soviet block specialists in unconventional, low intensity conflict. Some of Habré's soldiers were probably trained by gentlemen like «Fred,» that is by US specialists in unconventional war. These units once trained were led by ex officials who organized them along bureaucratic lines, influenced by contemporary notions of guerilla war[8]. Certainly the soldiers of different rebel forces tended to be drawn from the ethnicities of their leaders. However, rebel forces were never uniquely constituted by a single ethnicity (MAGNANT 1984: 48)[9].

Further, recruitment appears to have been as much from a specific educational category as from ethnicities. Throughout Chad there are young men who have had some formal education, but who have been obliged to stop schooling prior to finishing high school. Education gives these men aspirations beyond the local community. Many, in fact, dream of becoming *fonctionnaires* (officials). Economic conditions dictate that such men become largely underemployed urban laborers or that they return to their rural kin's land, where they become ordinary *meskin* (poorfolk). To such men, joining a liberation army is a way of becoming a «somebody.» Rebel forces, thus, tend to be led by ex officials who command soldiers that are would be officials.

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[8] The lst Army in the mid 1970s had acquired modern weapons and uniforms. It divided its zone of operations into seven *wilayas*, military commands. There was a military council that supervised the operations of the different commands. Each *wilay* was represented on the council by its commander and a delegate elected from its soldiers. Soldiers were given extensive training in guerilla operations; often from their own leaders, who had received such training from Middle Eastern or Soviet block specialists. A twenty page manual explained to the soldiers their responsibilities and the punishments that would be incurred if they were derelict in the execution of these. Weber would classify such a fighting force as bureaucratic.

[9] Sometimes is said that this or that liberation army is composed of Goran, Sara, or Hadjerai tribesmen, as if each of these terms designated a single, discrete, and fixed ethnicity. They do not. The terms Goran, Sara, or Hadjerai are generic expressions applied by outsiders that classify in common different peoples with different and changing ethnic identities. The word «Goran», for example, was used by Chadian Arabs with whom I lived in the early 1970s pretty much as a pejorative to describe anybody living in the desert. Kreda, Zagawa, Teda, Daza were all lumped together as Goran. Then, as today, a Zagawa knows that s/he is not a Teda.

The preceding suggests that neither condition needed to qualify Chad's wars as ethnic conflicts is satisfied. Put bluntly, Chadian presidential wars have not involved tribes fighting tribes over tribal affairs. They have involved officials, ex officials, and would be officials fighting each other for control over the state. The anarchy, then, is not the result of ethnic fratricide.

Nationalism

It might be argued that at the heart of the anarchy are nationalist ideologies[10]. Specifically, it might be hypothesized that the different actors in Chad's internal wars possess competing national aspirations, and that it is these that provoke in large measure the violence. So attention turns to the ideological discourse of important actors.

An essential similarity between all the presidents and most of their opponents, even as they tried to kill each other, is that they have been nationalists. Institutions of the state and rebels have functioned to create and diffuse emblems, rituals, and discourse championing their image of a Chadian nation. A sense of how inventive this nationalist imagery has been can be acquired if one explores the ideological discourses of Tombalbaye. He, in a nicely tailored French suit, appealed to all Chadians in a 1961 speech, saying «Before being Arab, Muslim, Christian or Sara, we are Chadians¼». He went on to promise the nation the gift of «*la vie moderne*» which would be achieved through «*développement*» (in LE CORNEC 1963: 315). Thus at the very beginning of Tombalbaye's rule nationalism is expressed in a discourse of modernization   one being espoused vigorously at the time by French technical advisers to his government, who probably wrote the text of his speech.

By the end of the 1960s, with the rebellion making the greatest headway in northern, Islamic areas, it was clear to all that the government needed to attract Muslims. So in 1972 the president, a Baptist, made the pilgrimage to Mecca; perhaps at the instigation of Ba

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[10] Discussion of ideology and nationalism in the context of Chad can be found in Magnant (1984) and Ciammaichella (1990).

Abdoul Aziz, a Mauritanian who served as Tombalbaye's advisor on Islamic matters. Afterwards he exchanged his suit for the robes worn by Muslims and styled himself *el hadj*. Thereafter his appeals for national unity had an Islamic ring to them.

However, by the late summer of 1973 Tombalbaye was concerned to create a truly Chadian nationalism. At the end of August the PPT was dissolved and replaced by the *Mouvement National pout la Révolution Culturelle et Sociale* (MNRCS). This new party's job was to invent tradition lots of it, and fast. The MNRCS was inspired by a similar movement occurring at the same time in Mobutu's Zaire. Operating incessantly over the radio, this cultural revolution demanded a «*rétour aux sources*». Gone was the Tombalbaye of modernization. Out was *el hadj*. In was the new Tombalbaye who spoke in terms of *tchaditude.*

There were echos in *tchaditude* of the *négritude* that had been important among African and Caribbean intellectuals in the 1920s through the 1950s. *Négritude*, however, sought to celebrate universal qualities shared by all blacks. *Tchaditude* was far more particularistic It was about Chad and Tombalbaye. It was a «Chadian socialism.» According to one document of the time, this «...was not a socialism based on that of Karl Marx. Chadian socialism has far more respect for the religious element that is one of the mental structures of the Chadian people... « (in BOUQUET 1982: 147).

In this *tchaditude*, the president was no longer merely a president. He was *Ngarta, le Guide*. He traveled now in the presence of his *Grand Griot* (Great praise singer) who always sang the qualities *du Guide*, such as «*Ngarta, champion des champions! Il connait tout, sans papier!*» and even in English «*Ngarta*, number one!» The griot's chants were echoed endlessly on the radio. Tombalbaye, then, had concocted three variations upon a nationalist discourse; and it did him no good.

His opponents shot him in the belly and left him to die. They did so in the name of nationalism. Frolinat, for example, which had been the key rebel organization in the struggle against Tombalbaye, stated that one of its major goals was the «...unity of the Chadian nation».

Mallourn and the CSM would stress an ideology

of «*Réconciliation Nationale*» that welcomed all into the «*grande famille tchadienne*». Malloum's chief opponent at the time was said to be «..above all a nationalist ... uncompromising in his determination to build a nationstate» (LEMARCHAND 1984: 65). When Habré seized the government he made the day he came to power «National Liberation, Unity and Martyrs» day. Further to disseminate his nationalism he created the *Union Nationale pour l'Indépendence et la Révolution* (UNIR), a party that in certain ways harked back to the MNRCS.

Déby today governs with a strongly nationalist ideology. Further, in response to the urging of both the French and the US, he has organized a *Conférence Nationale Souveraine*; one that seeks to institute more «democratic» means of attaining his nationalist goals. Nevertheless, the two major rebel movements Habré's MDD and Ketté's CSNPDT attack Déby on the grounds that his is a defective nationalism and theirs is not.

Thus the major political actors on all sides have consistently justified their actions on the basis of some form of nationalist ideology. Such evidence, of course, is consistent with a view that nationalism provokes Chadian conflict. However, I am skeptical of this view for reasons outlined below.

The proposition that «Chadian nationalisms provoke conflict» is causal. Causal statements express the existence of spatio temporal orderings events and of the fact that in these orderings antecedent events produce subsequent events (Miller 1987). This means that for a causal statement to be supported by evidence there must be observation of (1) spatio-temporal ordering and (2) the production of subsequents by antecedents. This would mean for the proposition under evaluation that (1) Chadian nationalism occurs first in time and that the conflicts occur subsequently and (2) that it is the nationalism that actually produces (i.e. causes) the conflicts.

Evidence bearing upon the preceding is as follows. A number of persons, such as Ibrahim Abatcha, were members of a party called the *Union Nationale Tchadienne* (UNT) in the early 1960s. This party, which has been called neo Marxist, was in opposition to

Tombalbaye's PPT. All parties save for the PPT were dissolved in 1962. This sharpened UNT strife against Tombalbaye. So the leadership of the UNT decided to draft a policy statement, written by Abatcha, that presented their position. Events soon moved quickly. There were anti Tombalbaye riots in 1963 that were violently suppressed.

This made anti Tombalbaye leaders, including most of the leaders of the UNT, flee Chad. These exiled leaders met in Nyala in the Sudan and created Frolinat on June 22, 1966. A «*programme politique*» was adopted at this time which, according to one commentator, was identical with that of the 1962 UNT policy statement (BUIJTENHIJS 1978: 123). This statement was the inception of Frolinat's version of Chadian nationalism.

The point to grasp is that those who would be Frolinat leaders were in conflict with Tombalbaye as far back as 1962. As a result of this, as a part of creating an organization to combat Tombalbaye violently, they also formulated a statement that would become their nationalistic justification of this combat. Thus spacio temporal ordering appears to be the reverse of what the proposition predicts. Instead of nationalism provoking conflict; conflict produced Frolinat's nationalism.

This spacio temporal sequencing of conflict and ideology seems to repeat itself through the succeeding presidencies. When Tombalbaye was replaced by Malloum in 1975, Goukouni and Habré were already involved in a bloody war with Malloum's government. Consequently they devised and broadcast over their radios endless discourses that discredited Malloum and praised themselves on nationalist grounds.

imilarly, when Goukouni drove Habré from Chad in 1980, the two were in the midst of a most violent war. As a result Habré invented his own brand of anti Goukouni ideology. The early anti Tombalbaye discourse of Frolinat complained that Tombalbaye sold out national sovereignty to the French. Habré, taking a page from this tactic, constructed Goukouni as a dupe of the Libyans and promised true national liberation if he were allowed to rule.

When Déby fled for his life to the Sudan in 1989 he was in the midst of a violent confrontation with Habré. His response was to create the MPS, and then from MPS sources issued an angry discourse suggesting that Habré was a tyrant who had sold out his country to the Israelis and the Americans. Déby, of course, promised that with him good times and national autonomy were just around the corner. In Chad, then, it seems that conflict causes those who are party to the conflict to invent nationalistic tradition, rather than the reverse. Nationalism does not appear to be a cause of Chad's anarchy[11].

State and autarkic institutions of violent force

How then does one account for the cycling between dis and reintegration? I begin to answer this question by documenting changes in the means of violence. Frolinat, in the earliest days of rebellion against Tombalbaye, had perhaps a hundred partisans who fought for the most part with lances. There were then under a thousand soldiers in Tombalbaye's army. By the time of Habré's rule in 1986 and 1987 there were perhaps 20,000 soldiers in different liberation armies armed with everything from tanks, to missiles, to phosphorous mortars. Habré may have had up to 25,000 people in his army. At present the two major rebel movements in opposition to Déby are reporting

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[11] Michalon has argued that authoritarian or dictatorial actions were encouraged in Chad in order «to break up traditional societies ... and thus allow the emergence of national feeling...» (1979). My view of the matter is different. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the period about which Michalon writes, there was little effort at least on the part of the state to «break up» ethnicities. Local governments had difficulties getting into the countryside to do the breaking up, either because they lacked the resources to do so or they were denied access by the rebels. Further, throughout this time the state was preoccupied with defeating rebels and did not want to create additional problems by provoking local communities. However, the espousal of nationalist sentiments gave a person legitimacy which allowed him or her to be a major political actor. Such actors soon became involved in violent contests for control over the state, whose very violence provoked authoritarian actions. In this view dictatorial practices are an unintended consequence of «hardball» politics, rather than an intended result of a strategy to create nationalism.

that they have 10,000 soldiers. While Déby is supposed to have an armed force estimated to number 50,000. In 1966 there were probably under 1,000 government and rebel soldiers. In 1994 there were well over 60,000 such soldiers. In 1966 these troops were poorly armed. In 1994 they possessed a ferocious array of the most modern weapons. A first finding is that there has been a spectacular accumulation of the means of violence in postcolonial Chad.

The accumulation of violent force has not been associated with its concentration in the hands of the central government because of the rebel military institutions formed during Tombalbaye's rule. These may be characterized as «autarkic» in the sense that they are independent of the government, which has its own institutions of violent force[12]. Thus the means of violence are dispersed across a number of autarkic and government military institutions in Chad. The structural history of postcolonial Chad has therefore involved both the accumulation and dispersion of violent force.

Autarkic institutions of violence exercise their violence to compete for control over the state. The existence of such institutions means that the government institutions of violence must resist their autarkic. competitors. Three inescapable necessities result. First, contests for control of the state must be violent. Second, as autarkic institutions of violence win, the state tends to disintegrate. Third, when autarkic institutions of violence have won, they become government institutions of violence, allowing the state to reintegrate. The preceding means that the fields of force in Chad are not only dispersed, they are unstable.

Such a structural history has implications for relations of domination. Specifically, it means that autarkic institutions of violent force are able to exhibit enormous resistance to the government. Five times this resistance has been so great that the government has lacked the means to overcome it. Thus in independent Chad dispersed fields of violent force have produced periodically bloody anarchy.

Why has this occurred? There appear to be two important determinants of postcolonial Chadian structural history. The first pertains to the accumulation of violent force. The enormous growth in local institutions of violence resulted from international competition for regional influence[13]. Libya, the US, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Israel, Togo, Burkina Faso, the Palestinians, Nigerians, Zairois, Egyptians, and the Sudanese have continually provided military resources to both liberation and government armies. However, the major suppliers of arms, training, and at times soldiers have been France in aid of the ruling regime[14], Libya, in promotion of the rebels, and the US, in support of whoever opposed Libya[15].

One military observer posed the question, «how can impoverished Chad afford to fight?» He responded to his question by noting, «the simple answer, of course, is that it can't. The war is being paid for by the French and the Americans» (COXE 1988: 166). The US, it will be recalled, is reported to have spent on the order of $100 million to rearm Habré in the early 1980s. The French then spent in the order of $500,000 per day between 1983 and 1986 defending Habré. The Israelis, Iraqis, and Zairois have operated in many ways as surrogates of the Americans. In sum, great power actions to influence Chad allowed both the government and the rebels to accumulate violent force. It has been the arming of both rebels and government troops that dispersed the accumulating violent force, and made for the instability in the fields of force. To the extent that the great powers created this instability, they were responsible for the anarchy it produced.

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[12] Autarkic, as used in the text, means that rebels are independent of the central government in the sense that they are not part of it. This obliges government to exercise force to control such institutions.

[13] Great power strategies vis à vis Africa are discussed in Foltz and Bienen (1985).

[14] Some discussion of the role France in Chadian military affairs can be found in Cox (1988).

[15] The full story of Libya's involvement in Chad is untold. However, an account of it until 1981 can be found in Neuberger (1982). Description of French/Libyan competition in Chad can be found in Somerville (1990). There are only anecdotal accounts of the US role in Chad.

Chad is among the poorest, least developed peripheries of the periphery, which poses the question, «Why the French and American interest?» There are, I believe, two answers to this question. The first is geopolitical and the second is more directly economic. Both answers ultimately bear upon the well being of French and American capitalists.

An American diplomat once confided to me that Chad is a «back door» to the Middle East and southern Africa. If, for example, he went on, Libya were to «destabilize» Chad, then it would be far easier to undermine Egypt and the Sudan as well as Zaire and southern Africa. If Egypt were destabilized, Western, and especially US, control over Near Eastern oil might be in jeopardy. Similarly, if Zaire and southern Africa were removed from the Western «camp,» a number of raw materials classified as of «strategic» importance to industry might be at risk. So French and American strategists insured better control over raw materials by holding the line in Chad. Access to such materials, of course, is not a matter to which capitalists are indifferent.

Then there is the matter of Chad's direct value to Western industry. As one commentator notes, «They key to French interest is the south's petroleum» (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 1993: 8). It has been suspected since colonial times that Chad is rich in mineral and oil resources. Oil was discovered in commercially exploitable quantities by the early 1970s. This was in two areas: around Lake Chad, where the MDD operates, and in the south near the town of Doba, where the CSNPD is active. The southern oil reserves are considerable. Exploitation of these by a US European consortium made up of Elf and Chevron under the leadership of Shell is supposed to begin in five years. French and US military investments in Chad allow them to protect the interests of Elf, Chevron, and Shell, thereby helping these companies to maintain healthy profits.

If great powers like the US and France made possible the accumulation and dispersal of violent force, local class structure provided the motivation to use them. Most Chadians, probably some 80%, are subsistence or semi subsistence cultivators. There are a few merchants and a very, very few manufacturers and employees of multi national corporations. The only occupation that permits the accumulation of wealth is that of the *haut fonctionnaire*. The high salaries, combined with sweet political deals, enjoyed by such officials allow them to acquire capital. This is typically funneled into local land and businesses as well as into international investments in capitalist enterprise. There are really only two choices in such a class structure. One can remain a desperately poor food producer, or one can become a bureaucrat. Given such choices, Chadian are strongly disposed to become and remain officials, even if this means taking a turn at leading an autarkic institution of violent force.

Dispersion of violent force

Apter and Rosberg experienced students of African politics following a review of some of the difficulties analysts have had understanding the postcolonial African state, suggest that it is now «...time for a new round of reconceptualizing...» (1994: 4). I argue below that the findings concerning Chad reoccur throughout the Third World; that these comparative findings indicate commentators have overlooked a significant aspect of the structural history of the Third World, postcolonial state; and, finally, that efforts to think about what has been overlooked constitute Apter and Rosberg's desired reconceptualization.

Table 1 summarizes data concerning the role of autarkic institutions of violence (hereafter abbreviated as AIVs) in African wars since 1960. A number of points of clarification are in order concerning the table. First, it includes data from forty sub Saharan African countries. Excluded are island states, such as Madagascar, and extremely small, and hence atypical, ones, such as Djibuti. States included in the table fall into one of two categories: those where there have been AIV wars against the central government, and those where such wars have been absent. War is said to have occurred if AIV/ government combat has led to at least one hundred deaths.

Each of the two major categories is divided into sub categories. The sub categories are distinguished in states where there has been AIV/government war in

terms of the numbers who have perished and whether there has been great or regional power involvement. «Involvement» is deemed to have occurred if a power has contributed combatants, logistics, training, or supplies to either the government or an AIV in a war.

Sub categories are distinguished in states without AIV/government war on the basis of whether AIVs have developed, even though they have not engaged in significant combat.

Table 1
INCIDENCE OF AIV-GIV WARFARE IN AFRICA (1960-1993)

AIV-GIV War Present	No AIV-GIV War
1. Somalia (Adam, 1992)	1. Lesotho (AC, 1986a)
2. Guinea (AC, 1986, Lemarchand, 1992)	2. Gabon (AC, 1990a)
3 Burundi (AC, 1990c)	3. Central African Republic (AC, 1991a)
4. Senegal (AC, 1990d)	4. Ivory Coast (Amoudji, 1986)
5. Chad	5. Tanzania (Lugalla, PC)
6. Gambia (AC, 1991b)	6. Botswana (Holm & Molutsi, 1992)
7. Sierre Leone (AC, 1992a)	7. Zambia (Decalo, 1998)
8. Liberia (AC, 1992b)	8. Malawi (Decalo, 1998)
9. Rwanda (AC, 1994a)	9. Ghana (McFarland, 1991)
10. Uganda (Avrigan & Hovey 1982)	10. Kenya (Decalo, 1998)
11. Congo-Brazzaville (Ballif 1993)	
12 Congo-Kinshasha (Young & Turner, 1985)	
13. Guinea-Bissao (Cabral, 1974)	
14. Sudan (Daly & Sikainga, 1993)	
15. Equatorial Guinea (Fegley, 1989)	
16. Mozambique (Finnegan, 1992)	
17. Namibia (Innes, 1974)	
18. Burkina Faso (Jaffré, 1989)	
19. Mauretania Marchesin, 1995)	
20. Zimbabwe (Martin & Johnson, 1981	
21. South Africa (Mokoena, 1993)	
22. Mali (Piettrowski, 1991)	
23. Niger (Charlick, 1991)	
24. Nigeria (Stremlau, 1978)	
25. Angola (Rusk 1987, Spikes, 1993)	
26. Ethiopia (Tiryneh, 1993)	
27. Western Sahara (Hodges, 1983)	
28. Eretria (Selassie, 1980)	
29. Cameroun (LeVine, 1974)	
30. Togo (Decalo, 1987a)	
31. Benin (Decalo, 1987b)	
Percentage 76%	Percentage 24%

(From: REYNA, S.P. 2003 [In press]. «Imagining Monsters: A Structural History of Warfare in Chad», in: *Globalization, transnationalism and violence*, edited by Jonathan Friedman. Walnut Creek, CA: Rowman and Littlefield).

The table justifies the following four points. First, that AIVs have been extremely widespread throughout sub Saharan Africa, occurring in 73 % of the states. Second, that AIV/government war is also common in Africa, reported to have occurred in 60 % of the states. Third, AIV/government war has been extraordinarily bloody. In the fourteen countries where such wars have been the most severe, approximately 3,600,000 people have perished. Fourth, great and regional powers have contributed to these wars, having been involved in 60 % of them. Such findings support the conclusion that AIV/government wars, and the anarchy they provoke, nurtured by great and regional powers have become a bloody fact of postcolonial, African life.

AIV/government wars have been frequent in other areas of the Third World. They have arisen throughout South America since the success of the Cuban Revolution, and dominated Central America in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua during the 1980s. The different liberation movements of the Middle East and North Africa, including contemporary fundamentalist ones, have pitted AIVs against their governments. Since the success of the Chinese Revolution such wars occurred throughout Asia in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the various fragments of what was Indochina. AIV/government war has been rare among great powers, with the major occurrence being the longstanding conflict in Northern Ireland.

Great and regional powers have been involved frequently in these wars with involvement often exhibiting a Cold War logic. This was one where if a Communist state supported a Third World AIV, a non Communist state would support that country's central government and vice versa. In sum, AIV/government war, enabled in part by great and regional powers, intending either to facilitate or resist the interests of capitalists, has been common throughout the Third World.

What are the implications of the preceding? It was noted that it is commonly understood that «...military control has increased in the world's states over the last thirty years...» (TILLY 1990: 205) and that this is especially true in the Third World (JACKMAN 1976).

Such a realization poses the question of the structural properties of this militarism.

Here the literature has emphasized the existence of coups d'état and the subsequent occupation of non military posts by military persons[16]. It is true that generals have moved from being merely generals to being generals who are also presidents. This is certainly an important structural process; one of consolidation, where non military offices come to be occupied by military personnel, conflating their non military with their military functions.

However, the findings of this article indicate that another structural process has been occurring at the same time. This has been a «leaking» of institutions of violence out of the realm of government into that of civil society. Thus, not one, but two, processes seem to characterize the recent structural history of states, and this second process has gone unimagined in the discourse concerning their militarism.

This previously unremarked structural history exhibits a dynamic different from that which occurred during the making of the modem European state. The structural history of these powers between A.D. 1500 and A.D. 1900 involved the evolution of fields of force in which violence was increasingly accumulated and concentrated within specialized, military institutions of the central government (TILLY 1990). Aristocrats became Don Quixote's, while revolting peasants, such as those reputed to have infested Sherwood Forest in the Middle Ages, were disarmed and sent packing to the factories. This dynamic is uncommon in poorer Third World states.

Why might the preceding be important? Max Weber, it will be remembered, defined the state as a field of force where government exercises a monopoly over violence (1958). States with such fields of force might be called «Weberian». Nobody monopolizes violence in the Chads of this world. Rather, on one side there is government, dominated by military professionals, arrayed on the other side against autarkic institutions of violence. So the structural dynamic that

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[16] An introduction to this literature can be found in Cammack, Pool, and Tordoff (1993: 133-169).

has been occurring in the Third World is a withering away of the Weberian state and its replacement by an all together more lethal variant.

The globe is moving into a situation of resource depletion as a result of the consumption of raw materials by capitalist enterprises (REYNA 1991). It does so at a time when the world is being populated by states whose fields of force feature a greater propensity to decide issues violently Such a conjuncture may well be of historic significance, marking the outset of a postmodern era of darkness when the state is continually under siege.

Conclusion

Unperceived forces, hence unimagined ones, marching to logics of autarkic and government institutions of violence jerk Chad into bloody anarchy, regardless of what anyone might intend. In this sense Chad is an unimagined state. Chad is not alone. The promoting of more lethal states among lesser powers seems to be a specialty of great powers as they go about the business of structuring the Third World to the satisfaction of capital. Such fosterings be they in Ethiopia, Somalia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, or Guatemala create gory realms, hells. We point our fingers at the Nazis, satisfied that they were evil, so we are not; unimagining of the states we create.

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